Index: lib/csp.js |
diff --git a/lib/csp.js b/lib/csp.js |
index 6e7656d1b552a99a74279fefe5fe037a13a89840..0efde04f9acafef0b0a23fe600fdfa05c697964d 100644 |
--- a/lib/csp.js |
+++ b/lib/csp.js |
@@ -17,53 +17,79 @@ |
"use strict"; |
-// The webRequest API doesn't support WebSocket connection blocking in Microsoft |
-// Edge and versions of Chrome before 58. Therefore for those we inject CSP |
-// headers below as a workaround. See https://crbug.com/129353 and |
-// https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/platform/issues/10297376/ |
-if (!browser.webRequest.ResourceType || |
- !("WEBSOCKET" in browser.webRequest.ResourceType)) |
+const {defaultMatcher} = require("matcher"); |
+const {BlockingFilter, RegExpFilter} = require("filterClasses"); |
+const {getDecodedHostname, stringifyURL} = require("url"); |
+const {checkWhitelisted} = require("whitelisting"); |
+const {FilterNotifier} = require("filterNotifier"); |
+ |
+const {typeMap} = RegExpFilter; |
+ |
+browser.webRequest.onHeadersReceived.addListener(details => |
{ |
- const {defaultMatcher} = require("matcher"); |
- const {BlockingFilter, RegExpFilter} = require("filterClasses"); |
- const {getDecodedHostname} = require("url"); |
- const {checkWhitelisted} = require("whitelisting"); |
+ // Chrome seems to sometimes give the response type of "xmlhttprequest" |
+ // instead of "main_frame", but when it does the tabId is always -1 and |
+ // the URL matches the initiator's URL (once normalised). |
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/06 19:43:24
Might this be the case when XHR (or fetch) is used
kzar
2018/03/07 15:07:01
I'm not sure what's causing this so far, I know th
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/07 17:27:07
Is there an example in which simply ignoring "xmlh
kzar
2018/03/12 16:33:42
Yes, the website I noticed this happening was rege
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/13 03:58:13
Ok, what's going on here is that the request you s
kzar
2018/03/13 18:11:01
Acknowledged.
|
+ // https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=805649 |
+ if (details.type == "xmlhttprequest" && |
+ (details.tabId > -1 || details.initiator && |
+ details.url != new URL(details.initiator).toString())) |
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/06 19:43:24
Why is it necessary to normalize the URL? Shouldn'
kzar
2018/03/07 15:07:01
Well if you add this debugging code in the listene
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/07 17:27:07
FWIW, this seems like a Chrome bug to me. All othe
kzar
2018/03/12 16:33:42
OK I've filed an issue with that for them https://
|
+ { |
+ return; |
+ } |
- browser.webRequest.onHeadersReceived.addListener(details => |
+ // To avoid an extra matchesAny for the common case let's assume no |
+ // $genericblock filters apply when searching for a matching $csp filter, |
+ // we can double check later if necessary. |
+ let specificOnly = false; |
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/06 19:43:24
Nit: This variable seems superfluous here. You can
kzar
2018/03/07 15:07:01
Strictly you're right, but I added it early in an
kzar
2018/03/13 18:11:01
Now that the logic is simplified this doesn't add
|
+ |
+ let url = new URL(details.url); |
+ let hostname = getDecodedHostname(url); |
+ let cspMatch = defaultMatcher.matchesAny(details.url, typeMap.CSP, hostname, |
+ false, null, specificOnly); |
+ if (cspMatch instanceof BlockingFilter) |
{ |
- let hostname = getDecodedHostname(new URL(details.url)); |
- let match = defaultMatcher.matchesAny("", RegExpFilter.typeMap.WEBSOCKET, |
- hostname, false, null, true); |
- if (match instanceof BlockingFilter && |
- !checkWhitelisted(new ext.Page({id: details.tabId}), |
- ext.getFrame(details.tabId, details.frameId))) |
+ if (details.tabId > -1) |
{ |
- details.responseHeaders.push({ |
- name: "Content-Security-Policy", |
- // We're blocking WebSockets here by adding a connect-src restriction |
- // since the Chrome extension API does not allow us to intercept them. |
- // https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=129353 |
- // |
- // We also need the frame-src and object-src restrictions since CSPs |
- // are not inherited from the parent for documents with data: and blob: |
- // URLs, see https://crbug.com/513860. |
- // |
- // We must use the deprecated child-src directive instead of worker-src |
- // since that's not supported yet (as of Chrome 56.) |
- // |
- // "http:" also includes "https:" implictly. |
- // https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6653486812889088 |
- value: "connect-src http:; child-src http:; " + |
- "frame-src http:; object-src http:" |
- }); |
- return {responseHeaders: details.responseHeaders}; |
+ let page = new ext.Page({id: details.tabId, url: details.url}); |
+ let frame = ext.getFrame(details.tabId, details.frameId); |
+ |
+ if (checkWhitelisted(page, frame, typeMap.DOCUMENT | typeMap.CSP)) |
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/06 19:43:24
If we check whether the document is whitelisted, a
kzar
2018/03/07 15:07:01
Well your comment made me realise I so far didn't
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/07 17:27:07
Forget about my original comment here. I mistakenl
kzar
2018/03/12 16:33:42
Acknowledged.
|
+ { |
+ return; |
+ } |
+ |
+ // We pay the price now for skipping the specificOnly check earlier, we |
+ // must check again for a CSP filter, this time making sure it's specific. |
+ specificOnly = !!checkWhitelisted(page, frame, typeMap.GENERICBLOCK); |
+ if (specificOnly) |
+ { |
+ cspMatch = defaultMatcher.matchesAny(details.url, typeMap.CSP, hostname, |
+ false, null, specificOnly); |
+ if (!(cspMatch instanceof BlockingFilter)) |
+ return; |
+ } |
+ |
+ FilterNotifier.emit("filter.hitCount", cspMatch, 0, 0, page); |
+ } |
+ // If we don't know the associated tab we'll have to check that if the URL |
+ // is whitelisted manually. Things like $sitekey whitelisting and filter hit |
+ // logging won't work, but it's the best we can do. |
+ else if (defaultMatcher.whitelist.matchesAny(stringifyURL(url), |
+ typeMap.DOCUMENT | typeMap.CSP, |
+ hostname)) |
+ { |
+ return; |
} |
Sebastian Noack
2018/03/06 19:43:24
Nit: Don't we omit braces anymore if there is only
kzar
2018/03/07 15:07:01
The rule is to not omit the braces if the block (o
|
- }, { |
- urls: ["http://*/*", "https://*/*"], |
- // We must also intercept script requests since otherwise Web Workers can |
- // be abused to execute scripts for which our Content Security Policy |
- // won't be injected. |
- // https://github.com/gorhill/uBO-Extra/issues/19 |
- types: ["main_frame", "sub_frame", "script"] |
- }, ["blocking", "responseHeaders"]); |
-} |
+ |
+ details.responseHeaders.push({ |
+ name: "Content-Security-Policy", |
+ value: cspMatch.csp |
+ }); |
+ |
+ return {responseHeaders: details.responseHeaders}; |
+ } |
+}, { |
+ urls: ["http://*/*", "https://*/*"], |
+ types: ["main_frame", "sub_frame", "xmlhttprequest"] |
+}, ["blocking", "responseHeaders"]); |